Toward a Cost-Effectiveness Assessment of State Ethics Commissions by Bradbury, Mark & NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University
Public Integrity, Fall 2007, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 333–347.
© 2007 ASPA. All rights reserved. 
ISSN 1099-9922/2007 $9.50 + 0.00. 
DOI 10.2753/PIN1099-9922090402
Toward a Cost-
Effectiveness 
Assessment of 
State Ethics 
Commissions
An Analysis of  
Enforcement Outputs
MARK D. BRADBURY
Abstract
This article provides an exploratory analysis of the outputs of state government 
ethics enforcement. Despite the burgeoning interest in the ethical dimensions of 
public administration among researchers and practitioners alike, there have been few 
systematic examinations of the actions and outputs of state ethics commissions and 
boards. Such data are critical to assessing the cost-effectiveness of the subnational 
ethics edifice. A review of the characteristics of state ethics commissions reveals 
substantial variation, suggesting that cost-effectiveness is best analyzed state by 
state. This research relies on data from the Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission 
to examine the outputs of ethics enforcement. The examination of formal orders 
reveals that all types of officials (elected, appointed, and career) run afoul of ethics 
laws in myriad ways, with varied levels of severity and consequence. This unique 
analysis of the outputs of state ethics enforcement is an essential component to 
understanding the nature, and effectiveness, of ethics in practice.
The public administration literature abounds with discussions, analysis, and research 
focused on the significance of public sector ethics to individuals, teams, agencies, 
and networks.1 In an analysis of recent ethics-related empirical literature, Menzel 
(2005; see also Menzel with Carson 1999) categorized the research along five foci: 
ethical decision-making, ethics laws and regulatory agencies, organizational perfor-
mance and ethics, ethics management, and community and the ethical environment. 
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He reported that in all five of these categories, despite a noticeable increase in the 
number of articles that use empirical methodologies, the literature continues to be 
dominated by works with a normative or conceptual focus. Of particular interest 
for the present discussion is the implication that there are but a handful of empirical 
studies that address the primary institutions for ethics enforcement: state government 
ethics boards and commissions.
This article provides an analysis of output data on state ethics enforcement as part 
of a larger effort to measure the cost-effectiveness assessment of subnational ethics 
regulation. It focuses on formal orders, an output issued by an ethics commission 
upon the completion of a formal investigation and reflecting its factual findings and 
legal conclusions in regard to an alleged ethics violation. More than 140 orders from 
the Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission 
were examined in order to ascertain what 
types of officials commit ethical infractions, 
and the nature and severity of the violations. 
The case study of Pennsylvania spotlights the 
myriad ways that public officials run afoul of 
ethics laws. This examination of the practical 
pitfalls of public administrators is a necessary 
component of a robust appreciation of the role 
of state ethics commissions. Consequently, 
this article enhances the literature on state ethics commissions and is a first step 
toward a cost-effectiveness analysis of these street-level enforcers of ethics.
Analytical Impetuses
This project was conceived through a consideration of the work of three scholars 
who have made important contributions to the literature on ethics regulation, enforce-
ment, and effectiveness. Mackenzie (2002) conducted a systematic and wide-ranging 
analysis of the costs and effects of ethics regulation in the federal government (see 
also Anechiarico and Jacobs 1998; Garment 1991). As he demonstrates, the modern 
era of ethics regulation began in earnest during the Kennedy administration, and each 
subsequent presidential administration added new rules and limitations. The implicit 
assumption was that more ethics regulation makes for better ethics. The problem, 
as Mackenzie saw it, is that few attempts have been made to take the measure of 
this ethics edifice to ascertain its costs, benefits, and effects. He examined the full 
range of devices designed to make the federal government “scandal-proof,” includ-
ing public financial disclosure, training, and background checks, and concluded that 
“we can find little evidence that government integrity is greater today than it was 
when this movement to expand federal ethics policy began more than four decades 
ago” (2002, 154).
The question of the effectiveness of ethics regulation is no less important at the 
state level. As Freel (2004, 283) rightly observed, however, meaningful, generalized 
comparisons of state ethics regulations are “challenging” and “particularly hard,” 
and in fact this is a common lament related to cross-state policy comparisons of all 
kinds. Freel outlined a number of specific factors that complicate comparisons of 
ethics agencies: “how states define ‘ethics,’ the breadth of those governed, the extent 
of authority granted oversight agencies, and the nature and composition of those 
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governing ethical conduct” (2005, 366). Despite these challenges, other researchers 
have catalogued selected similarities and differences among state ethics enforcement 
agencies (see Lewis and Gilman 2005; Van Wart 1996).
Finally, the present research is influenced by Smith’s (2003) in-depth examina-
tion of the ethics enforcement agencies in Connecticut, New York, and Florida. He 
conducted more than a dozen anonymous interviews with officials and stakeholders 
in each of these three states and identified a number of roles and contributions made 
by state ethics commissions. One important point is that ethics commissions, despite 
their legalistic orientation (294), are not immune to political pressure and influence. 
As such, they tend to be reactive in nature. Furthermore, a primary contribution 
and responsibility of ethics commissions is to “help build the ethical capacity of 
the individual administrator in government” (294).
Taken together, these works lead to important questions from a practical public-
administration perspective and to the central research questions considered in this 
article. First, which type of official—elected, appointed, or career—violates state 
ethics laws, and how severe are the infractions? More specifically, how often do 
career employees commit ethics infractions, and what types of infractions are they 
likely to commit? Output data from the Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission 
provide a unique opportunity to explore such questions later in this article related to 
subnational ethics enforcement in practice and, in doing so, expands upon previous 
research on state ethics commissions.
State Ethics Commissions
Nearly every state regulates the ethical conduct of government officials, but there 
have been few systematic examinations of the range and scope of the powers of 
state ethics commissions. One important line of research addresses laws covering 
the ethical behavior of state legislators. A notable contribution to this body of re-
search was made by Goodman, Holp, and Ludwig (1996). They constructed several 
measures of the relative strength of ethics regulation in forty-three states. In their 
view, the observed differences in strength could be explained with reference to the 
political culture and professionalization of the state legislatures.
Additional important research by Rosenson (2003a, 2003b, 2005) traced the his-
tory of state legislative ethics commissions. She identified the factors that explain 
why legislators enact rules that run counter to their “apparent self-interest” by 
restricting their behavior and perks. Very often legislators do so because of public 
outrage at governmental scandals of various kinds. Rosenson concluded that such 
self-imposed limitations often include loopholes that take account of such concerns 
as “institutional maintenance, privacy, economic well-being, and political power” 
(149).
A second body of research on ethics commissions expands the focus to include 
all types of governmental actors, including career employees. Research of this kind 
typically relies on the “Blue Book,” an annual compendium of state ethics laws 
and agencies published by the Council on Governmental Ethics Laws (COGEL). 
Freel (2004) used the Blue Book for a thorough state-by-state comparison of the 
types of officials covered, indicating whether each state’s ethics agency had juris-
diction over executive branch employees, judges, judicial employees, legislative 
employees, legislators, lobbyists, state and local appointed officials, local elected 
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officials, private sector/vendors, state colleges and universities, and state and local 
employees (292–293).2 He found that some states divide ethics jurisdiction along the 
lines of the separation of powers, whereas others charge one agency with oversight 
of officials in all three branches (284). Overall, Freel identified “40 different state 
boards, committees, commissions, and/or individual commissioners that govern 
ethical conflicts of interests, standards of conduct and disclosure” (2005, 366; see 
also Menzel 2007).
Lewis’s (1991) work constitutes the most thorough examination of state ethics pro-
visions and practices. She identified and catalogued common types of jurisdictional 
authority and organizational characteristics, including the nature of the governing 
board or authority, the types of officials covered, and enforcement and investigatory 
powers. Lewis (1993) counted the number of states that prohibit various types of 
activities and conflicts of interest (138). Lewis and Gilman (2005) observed, overall, 
that “Diversity best describes the overall pattern of state ethics laws and practices” 
(196). This conclusion applies to virtually all important characteristics of such agen-
cies, including the types of officials covered and their enforcement powers. However, 
the thrust of the discussion focused on prohibited activities, such as the appearance 
of impropriety, whistleblowing, bribery, and conflict of interest (197–202).3
Collectively the authors discussed above clearly demonstrate that ethics com-
missions vary widely in structure and enforcement capabilities. Their conclusions 
are supported by detailed tabular compilations of descriptive characteristics (see 
COGEL 2002; Freel 2004). None of these authors, however, sought to analyze the 
correlation between the descriptive characteristics they compiled and the policy 
outputs of state ethics commissions. This correlation is essential to the develop-
ment of cost-effective measures of subnational ethics regulation in the mold of 
Mackenzie’s analysis (2002) of the federal ethics edifice. The research presented 
herein adds to the descriptive literature by taking an exploratory first step toward 
understanding how ethics enforcement by a state ethics commission manifests as 
policy outputs.
Ethics Enforcement
There is no shortage of discussion and analysis of governmental corruption in the 
popular press and the academic literature. Similarly, there is no shortage of laws 
and regulations designed to punish those who, wittingly or not, take personal ad-
vantage of their trusted public positions. Scandals and corruption can result from 
any number of behaviors and activities, such as bribery, improper political activity, 
nepotism, the revolving door, and insider information. Studies of ethics regulations 
applying to state legislators suggest that the frequency and notoriety of scandals 
explain, in part, the enactment of stricter ethics laws (Goodman, Holp, and Ludwig 
1996; Rosenson 2005).
Mackenzie (2002) identified two concurrent trends in regard to scandals affecting 
the federal government. First, the amount and types of resources dedicated to the 
pursuit of corruption have vastly increased. In addition to the establishment of the 
offices of the inspector general and the independent counsel, standing agencies such 
as the FBI and U.S. attorneys’ offices have grown in terms of budget and staff size 
(105). The second observed trend is an increase in the number of federal officials 
indicted and convicted. An important caveat is in order, however. The definition of 
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corruption was changed in 1983, and as a result now includes a broader range of 
activities and behaviors (104). It is hardly surprising that more resources and an ex-
panded definition have resulted in an upward trend in documented criminal behavior. 
Mackenzie concludes that the sensational appeal of charges of unethical behavior so 
outweighs the actual instances of wrongdoing that “worry about the ethics of public 
officials greatly exceeds formal evidence of ethical violations” (98).
Maass (1987) identified another problem with the prosecution of public officials 
by federal attorneys. He argued that federal prosecutions of state and local officials 
violate the principle of federalism and constitute “the most serious and politically 
disabling federal intrusion of recent years into the independent political status of 
state and local governments” (196). In his view, “cleaning up political corruption in 
state and local governments is not enumerated or implied as a power of the federal 
government in the Constitution” (227). One implication is that states must bear the 
burden of ethics enforcement in their own jurisdictions.
The two most common enforcement techniques used by state ethics commissions 
are advisory opinions and formal investigations leading to citations. No research 
could be found in the public administration literature that systematically examines 
either of these enforcement outputs. Such an examination is a critical component 
of a robust cost-effectiveness analysis of state ethics commissions.
Advisory Opinions
Ethics commissions in all but three states are authorized to “issue advisory opinions, 
declaratory rulings, or interpretive statements” (Lewis and Gilman 2005, 196–197). 
Typically, an official approaches the commission with a before-the-fact request for 
ethical guidance or a legal interpretation. Some states allow the requester and the 
official in the agency who provides the advice or interpretation to remain anony-
mous. Formal opinions are usually issued by the commission, but staff members or 
in-house counsel are often authorized to provide informal advice (COGEL 2002). 
Formal opinions typically constitute an official ruling on the question at hand and 
can provide a defense against enforcement actions by the state commission.
At least thirty-four state commissions and the U.S. Office of Government Ethics 
have the authority to issue advisory opinions (see Table 1). The level of formality 
varies, however. Twenty states issue only informal, nonbinding opinions. The other 
fourteen issue formal, binding opinions, and perhaps informal opinions. This variation 
affects the average number of opinions issued each year as reported in Table 1, because 
the data do not distinguish between formal and informal opinions (Freel 2004).
The Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission has the authority to issue opinions 
and advices, but these are not binding on the requester (see Table 1). A review of 
twenty-four opinions issued by the Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission in 2002 
and 2003 found that all related, in part, to the question of whether the requesting 
official was covered by the state ethics law. Seven requesters asked for deletions 
and changes in the opinion in order to protect confidentiality. A clear majority of the 
requesters, seventeen out of twenty-four, waived the option of confidentiality, thus 
revealing their name, the nature of their position, the agency where employed, the 
level of government, and their ethical query. Additional research is sorely needed 
to more fully understand these opinions, including why some requesters chose 
to waive confidentiality, because these before-the-fact requests for guidance and 
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TABLE 1  
Issuance of Formal Advisory Opinions Across States
Authority to 
issue
Binding on 
requester
Average no. 
per year
U.S. Office of Government Ethics Y Y
Alabama Ethics Commission Y 52
Alaska Public Offices Commission Y Y 5–25
Arkansas Ethics Commission Y 15
California Fair Political Practices  
Commission Y Y 200–300
Connecticut State Ethics Commission Y Y 30
Delaware Public Integrity Commission Y 60
Florida Commission on Ethics Y Y 23
Georgia State Ethics Commission Y 1
Hawaii State Ethics Commission Y Y 1–5
Indiana State Ethics Commission Y 5
Iowa Ethics and Campaign Disclosure 
Board Y 8
Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission Y Y 40– 45
Kentucky Executive Branch Ethics  
Commission Y Y 70
Louisiana Ethics Administration Y 348
Maine Commission on Government Ethics 
and Election Practices Y Y 5
Maryland State Ethics Commission Y Y 10
Massachusetts Ethics Commission Y Y 2
Michigan State Board of Ethics Y 2
Minnesota Campaign Finance and Public 
Disclosure Board Y 15
Montana Commissioner of Political 
Practices Y 50
Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure 
Commission Y 9
Nevada Commission on Ethics Y Y 20
New Jersey Executive Commission on 
Ethical Standards Y 20
New York State Ethics Commission Y Y 5–10
North Carolina Board of Ethics Y 10–15
Ohio Ethics Commission Y 137
Oklahoma Ethics Commission Y 5–7
Oregon Government Standards and  
Practices Commission Y Y 40–50
Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission Y 125–200
Rhode Island Ethics Commission Y 120
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advice offer a rare perspective into the practical ethical dilemmas faced by public 
administrators.4
Regrettably, many public officials, for reasons unknown, do not take advantage 
of the opportunity presented by advices and opinions and in consequence engage in 
behavior and decision-making that violates ethics laws. The descriptive literature on 
state ethics commissions does not examine the link between ethics laws and powers 
and the use of these powers when laws are violated (see Freel 2004 and 2005; Lewis 
1991 and 1993; Lewis and Gilman 2005). The second common technique of ethics 
enforcement, formal investigations and citations of ethics violations, represents such 
a linkage, and it is to these data that this research now turns.
Investigations
Most state ethics commissions have the authority to investigate alleged viola-
tions of the state’s ethics laws (Lewis 1993). There are substantial differences, 
however, in the scope and nature of their investigatory authority and the range of 
punitive measures that can be levied. Comparison of enforcement powers across 
state commissions is complicated, however, by “the type of ethics statutes or 
regulations themselves—whether civil, criminal, and/or administrative in remedy, 
or some combination thereof—and other differences in their authority” (Freel 
2004, 284).  
For states with ethics regulations, as Smith notes, “investigations are real, as are 
the penalties imposed” (2003, 290). The ethics agencies in Connecticut and New 
York, for example, have the authority to impose fines and recommend civil or crimi-
nal penalties, whereas the Florida commission “can only make recommendations 
to the appropriate jurisdiction” (287). Such variations show the need for in-depth 
analysis of the enforcement powers of other state ethics commissions.
At least thirty-four state ethics agencies and the U.S. Office of Government Ethics 
have the authority to conduct some form of investigation of alleged violations of 
ethics law (see Table 2). Freel (2004) identifies four types of investigatory authority: 
investigate on their own initiative, respond to a complaint, examine reimbursements, 
and assess the merits of an anonymous complaint (294–296). The first two types 
of investigatory authority are represented state-by-state in Table 2. Two of the state 
commissions are only authorized to investigate on their own initiative, and another 
three can only respond to a complaint.5 Most of the states, twenty-nine out of thirty-
Authority to 
issue
Binding on 
requester
Average no. 
per year
Texas Ethics Commission Y Y 10
Washington State Executive Ethics Board Y 10
West Virginia Ethics Commission Y 35–40
Wisconsin State Ethics Board Y 25
Source: COGEL (2002) and Freel (2004).
Key: Y = Yes
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TABLE 2 
Investigatory Power of State Ethics Commissions
Authority  
on own  
initiative
Respond to 
complaint
Average no. 
per year
U.S. Office of Government Ethics Y Y
Alabama Ethics Commission Y Y 329
Alaska Public Offices Commission Y Y 5–10
Arkansas Ethics Commission Y Y 112
California Fair Political Practices  
Commission Y Y 160
Connecticut State Ethics Commission Y Y
Delaware Public Integrity Commission Y Y 3–7
Florida Commission on Ethics Y 117
Georgia State Ethics Commission Y Y 125
Hawaii State Ethics Commission Y Y 10–20
Indiana State Ethics Commission Y Y 50
Iowa Ethics and Campaign Disclosure 
Board Y 5
Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission Y Y 3–5
Kentucky Executive Branch Ethics  
Commission Y Y 20
Louisiana Ethics Administration Y Y 113
Maine Commission on Government Ethics 
and Election Practices Y Y 9
Maryland State Ethics Commission Y Y
Massachusetts Ethics Commission Y Y 114
Michigan State Board of Ethics Y Y
Minnesota Campaign Finance and Public 
Disclosure Board Y Y 2
Montana Commissioner of Political 
Practices Y 15–20
Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure 
Commission Y Y 40
Nevada Commission on Ethics Y Y 50
New Jersey Executive Commission on 
Ethical Standards Y Y 35
New York State Ethics Commission Y Y 40
North Carolina Board of Ethics Y Y 5–10
Ohio Ethics Commission Y Y 56
Oklahoma Ethics Commission Y 10
Oregon Government Standards and  
Practices Commission Y Y 100–150
Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission Y Y 100
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four, authorize their commissions to commence investigations on their own initiative 
and in response to complaints. 
Pennsylvania Ethics Orders. Whether initiating an investigation on its own 
initiative or responding to a complaint, the Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission 
issues a formal order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law (see Ex-
hibit 1). Much like the orders issued by the agencies in Connecticut and New York 
(Smith 2003), these carry potential penalties of fines and/or imprisonment. Under 
Pennsylvania law, violations of the public financial-disclosure policy, accepting an 
honorarium or severance payment, entering into an inappropriate contract, violating 
the revolving-door policy, and certain other infractions are misdemeanors that can 
be punished by a fine of up to $1,000 and a year in prison. A conflict-of-interest 
infringement, seeking or accepting improper influence, and violating the confiden-
tiality of investigatory proceedings, on the other hand, are classified as felonies and 
can result in a fine up to $10,000 and five years in prison.
For the purposes of the present research, 148 orders issued by the Pennsylva-
nia commission between 2000 and 2003 were examined.6 The research variables 
included the type of employee (elected, appointed, or career),7 the nature of the 
violation, and the classification of the violation. This analysis was the first known 
use of enforcement data drawn from ethics orders. While the use of official orders 
admittedly reflects a legalistic conception of ethics, the data allow for a unique 
accounting of the number and nature of ethical violations by elected, appointed, 
and career employees.8 Consequently, orders can provide a direct test of Smith’s 
(2003, 291) observation that commissions “focus not so much on the big players in 
government, but on the rank-and-file employees.” 
All Officials. The data in Table 3 show a relatively even dispersion of orders 
across elected, appointed, and career officials in Pennsylvania. Elected officials 
accounted for 39 percent of the orders, and 32 percent were for appointed officials. 
The remaining 28 percent of the orders were for career employees of state and lo-
cal government. In light of the fact that the number of career employees naturally 
exceeds the number of elected and appointed officials, this finding does not support 
the evidence analyzed by Smith (2003). Such conflicting conclusions underscore 
the importance of widening the collective investigation of output data to include 
additional states.
For all officials in Pennsylvania, the total number of misdemeanor offenses, 
126 (52%), was roughly the same as the number of felony offenses (115, or 48%). 
Within misdemeanor offenses, 75 percent were for violations of the state’s financial-
Authority  
on own  
initiative
Respond to 
complaint
Average no. 
per year
Rhode Island Ethics Commission Y Y 30
Texas Ethics Commission Y Y 76
Washington State Executive Ethics Board Y Y 100
West Virginia Ethics Commission Y 12–15
Wisconsin State Ethics Board
Y Y
10
Source: COGEL (2002) and Freel (2004).
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disclosure law. These ran the gamut from failure to file a statement outlining one’s 
sources of income, major real estate interests, gifts received, and other investments, 
to the omission of specific related information, such as the amount of the item or 
contact information for parties associated with an item. Compared to other states, 
Pennsylvania requires a wide range and large number of officials to submit annual 
financial-disclosure statements, and the state’s ethics commission is ultimately 
charged with processing and verifying all of the disclosure filings (see Exhibit 1). 
Thus, it is hardly surprising that a sizable proportion of the misdemeanor offenses 
relate to disclosure forms. Also notable is that 21 percent of the misdemeanor orders 
were for entering into illegal contracts. State law places restrictions on contracts 
valued at $500 or more where a public official or employee has a personal or fa-
milial interest.
Turning to felony offenses, conflicts of interest accounted for 97 percent of the 
felony orders across all types of officials. State law holds that “No public official 
Exhibit 1 
Jurisdiction of Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission
The Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission is an independent agency charged with 
administering and enforcing the state ethics law, first enacted in 1978 (Annual Report 
2003). The commission has seven members: one each appointed by the president 
pro tempore of the Senate, the minority leader of the Senate, the speaker of the 
House, and the minority leader of the House, and three appointed by the governor. 
The commission has a budget appropriation of $1.76 million and is served by more 
than twenty staff members organized into functional and regional divisions. Such re-
sources are necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, to ensure the uniform application 
of the ethics law to all public officials in state, county, and local government, except 
for teachers at all levels.
The commission is responsible for three areas of ethics-related jurisdiction: 
financial disclosure, advice/opinions, and orders. All candidates, nominees, elected 
officials, appointed officials, and public employees are required to disclose sources 
of income, gifts, creditors, and related expenses to the commission for review and 
inspection. The Pennsylvania law is notable in that all state and local employees 
are required to file. This accounts for a large portion of the approximately 150,000 
reports filed per year in the state (COGEL 2002).
All officials under the commission’s jurisdiction can request a prospective interpre-
tation of the ethics law regarding their duties and the applicability of the ethics law. 
Upon receipt of such a before-the-fact request, the chief counsel decides whether the 
issue requires a formal review by the commission or an informal review by the chief 
counsel. A review by the commission results in a formal opinion, while an advice 
presents a less formal option where the chief counsel provides the interpretation. Ad-
vices can serve as a defense against subsequent criminal or civil actions, albeit with a 
reduced level of protection vis-à-vis opinions.
Finally, the commission is expected to investigate sworn complaints and initiate 
investigations on its own. The commission retains seven full-time investigators to 
respond to the nearly 300 complaints received each year. Upon completion of an inves-
tigation, the commission may issue a formal statement of the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law called an order. Such orders can be appealed to the state court system.  
All financial disclosures, advices, opinions, and orders are public record and are posted 
on the agency’s Web page. This online library “shines light” on the commission’s 
regulation of ethics, and facilitated the collection of output data for this article.
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TABLE 3 
Ethical Violations by Type of Official and Violation
Orders by Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission, 2000–2003 (n = 148)
Official Level of offense No. of orders
% of type of 
order
Elected Misdemeanors 54 100
n = 58 Financial disclosure 39 72
Illegal contract 15 28
Felonies 47 100
Conflict of interest 45 96
Confidentiality 2 4
Appointed Misdemeanors 34 100
n = 48 Financial disclosure 22 65
Illegal contract 9 26
Illegal representation 2 6
Voting conflict 1 3
Felonies 34 100
Conflict of interest 34 100
Career Misdemeanors 38 100
n = 42 Financial disclosure 34 89
Illegal contract 2 5
Illegal representation 2 5
Felonies 34 100
Conflict of interest 33 97
Improper influence 1 3
or public employee shall engage in conduct that constitutes a conflict of interest.” 
Violations of this prohibition are inherently idiosyncratic to the type of official in 
question, making generalized conclusions difficult.
Career Employees. The data from Pennsylvania shed considerable light on eth-
ics violations by career employees—that is to say, public administrators. In terms 
of misdemeanor violations, most of the offenses, 89 percent, were for deficient or 
delinquent filings of financial disclosure. Pennsylvania is unusual among the states 
in requiring its career employees to disclose their finances. In fact, the approximately 
150,000 financial filings per year far exceed the total for any other state (COGEL 
2002). A positive correlation between the larger number of filings and numerous 
violations would thus be expected.
In terms of felony infractions by career employees, 97 percent were for conflicts 
of interest (see Table 3). The conflict-of-interest orders show that career employees 
run afoul of state ethics laws in several ways (see Table 4). For instance, two em-
ployees used their official positions to obtain employment opportunities for family 
members, two others accepted inappropriate gifts from private parties, and nine 
entered into inappropriate contractual arrangements with private parties while in 
their official capacity. More than half of the career employees cited for felony viola-
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tions either abused policies related to pay, benefits, or reimbursement for expenses 
incurred while conducting official business or used public property, resources, or 
equipment for private gain.
From a certain perspective, the situation may not be quite as bad as it seems from 
the foregoing observations. Sometimes officials may be unsure whether a particular 
behavior, decision, or relationship is prohibited because of generalized or vague 
statutory language. The law defining the felonies identified in Table 4 states that 
“No public official or public employee shall engage in conduct that constitutes a 
conflict of interest,” but this language is hardly self-explanatory. On the other hand, 
Pennsylvania’s ethics agency allows employees to submit anonymous requests for 
before-the-fact opinions and advice. This opportunity would seem to trump any 
defense of ignorance or confusion related to the meaning of the ethics law. Overall, 
these violations plainly show that the edifice of public service ethics enforcement 
has very practical relevance to public administrators, who would do well to heed 
the lessons these formal orders tell.
Findings
A descriptive review of the organizational characteristics, mandates, and jurisdic-
tions of state ethics commissions reveals meaningful diversity, suggesting that 
cost-effectiveness is best analyzed state by state. Focusing on the Pennsylvania 
State Ethics Commission, this research provided a unique analysis of enforcement 
outputs, including opinions and formal orders. The preliminary review of two dozen 
opinions revealed notable variations in the nature of the request and the relative de-
sire for confidentiality by the requester, strongly suggesting that additional in-depth 
exploration is warranted across the states.
With regard to formal orders, a substantial majority at the misdemeanor level 
related to missing, incomplete, or improper filings of financial disclosure. Penn-
sylvania stands out among the states by requiring an unusually large number of 
officials to disclose their finances. Since approximately 150,000 reports are filed 
each year, it is hardly surprising that a large proportion of the commission’s orders 
relate to financial disclosure. Consistent with Mackenzie’s assessment of federal 
ethics laws (2002), a wide ethics net will catch more violators. Decision-makers 
in the state must decide whether the resources needed to process and verify such 
a large number of filings, not to speak of the time and effort expended by so many 
TABLE 4 
Felony Conflict-of-Interest Orders for Career Public Administrators
Type of felony order No. of orders % of type of order
Nepotism 2 6
Pay, benefits, and/or reimbursement 7 21
Gifts 2 6
Illegal contract 9 27
Personal use 13 39
Total 33 100
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officials in completing their disclosures, is justified by the fewer than 100 misde-
meanor violations over a four-year period.
Most of the remaining misdemeanor violations, and many of the felony orders 
for career employees, relate to the illegal negotiation or authorization of contracts 
with private companies or nonprofit organizations. Given the momentum of the 
privatization movement, these three dozen or so violations are practical illustrations 
of the pitfalls of this relatively new phenomenon in state and local government. 
Given the increasing number of contractual relationships, and the often sizable dollar 
amounts associated with contracting-out, a larger number of violations in this area 
should probably be expected. Subsequent studies should focus on the trend-line of 
illegal contract orders to see whether they present evidence of an emerging negative 
consequence of privatization.
At the felony level, the Pennsylvania data show that violations of conflict-of-inter-
est laws account for most of the orders. The violations committed by career employ-
ees included the inappropriate personal use 
of government property, nepotism, the illegal 
acceptance of gifts, and abuses of policies 
concerning pay, benefits, and reimbursement. 
While this comment is not meant to suggest 
empathy for the offending employees, one is 
struck by the banality of the back-stories of 
many of these violations. The orders are tell-
ing illustrations of the practical ethical pitfalls facing all administrators.
Conclusion
The research discussed in this paper lends credence to the difficulty of drawing 
national generalizations about state ethics commissions (Freel 2004) and the im-
portance of state-specific analysis of structures and outputs. The data represent 
an exploratory first step, building on the research of Smith (2003) and Lewis and 
Gilman (2005), toward systematic and comprehensive analysis of state-level eth-
ics enforcement.
The analysis of Pennsylvania Ethics Commissions orders focused overdue attention 
on the types of violations committed by officials of all types. A thorough investiga-
tion of the outputs associated with state ethics enforcement is notably lacking in the 
literature. And while financial-disclosure requirements, for example, do not apply to 
most public administrators across the country (COGEL 2002), this research shows 
that the laws addressing nepotism, contracts, conflicts of interest, and the like are 
often violated by otherwise upstanding and dedicated employees. For this reason if 
no other, the violations examined herein have resonance for all public officials.
Although these data were drawn from only one state, this research underscores the 
relevance of ethics commissions to the study and practice of public administration. 
The focus on the outputs of state ethics enforcement, in the spirit of Mackenzie’s 
(2002) discussion of federal ethics rules, is a necessary component for a cost-ef-
fectiveness analysis of state ethics regulation. Although the question of how much 
ethics enforcement is enough can be addressed from a philosophical or a theoretical 
perspective, the discussion of governmental ethics could benefit greatly at this point 
from additional empirically based studies. 
 At the felony level, the Pennsylvania 
data show that violations of conflict-
of-interest laws account for most of the 
orders.
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NOTES
1. A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2006 American Political 
Science Association Conference. The author would like to thank the three anonymous 
reviewers for their thoughtful and supportive guidance in the revisions of this article, as 
well as Jennifer Spear for her research assistance and Dr. Robert Smith for his generous and 
thorough comments on this research. Finally, to my son William, who, had he been born 
by his due date, would have greatly delayed the writing and revision of this article.
2. Government employees are defined here as public officials who were neither 
elected nor appointed through a political process and do not work directly on the staff 
of an elected official or judge.
3. The Better Government Association compiled an Integrity Index (2002) that 
ranked the fifty states based on the transparency, accountability, and limits of their ethics 
laws. The subjective selection of laws for inclusion in the index, combined with meth-
odological concerns related to the scoring and analysis of the laws, has raised questions 
about the reliability of the study. As a result, the BGA index cannot be relied upon as 
background in this article.
4. The next stage in this line of research to develop a cost-effectiveness model for 
state ethics commissions would be a content and context analysis of formal opinions and 
informal advices in numerous states.
5. See Menzel (1996) for a thorough analysis of ethics complaints in Florida.
6. Only orders that confirm the occurrence of a violation were included in this study. 
Since no variation was observed in year-by-year analysis between 2000 and 2003, the 
148 cases were grouped for analysis.
7. Within the dataset, elected and appointed include officials in both the legislative 
and executive branches, and in special districts; the vast majority worked in local and 
county government.
8. Given the centrality of ethics in public administration curricula, this analysis 
of outputs has great import for the teaching of public service ethics. Academics have 
produced numerous volumes and resources to help bring applied public service ethics 
into the classroom. One stream highlights exemplary, although largely unsung, public 
servants (see especially Cooper and Wright, 1992; Riccucci, 1995). Alternatively, Adams 
and Balfour (2004) focused attention on the perils of the administrative state and the 
bureaucratic condition in Unmasking Administrative Evil. 
Many of the orders of the Pennsylvania Ethics Commission (Annual Report 2003), 
however, told the story of an average, everyday street-level bureaucrat gone astray, and 
few of the misdeeds rose to a macro-level of ethics failure. The sequence of events lead-
ing to the ethics-related citation could be used to show students (and instructors, for that 
matter) the relative ease with which otherwise honest public servants can take one ill-
advised step and thereby damage their standing and reputation. The pedagogical value 
of the orders is underscored by their ability to show, in this way, the great practical value 
of discussions of conflicts of interest, contracting rules, and the like.
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